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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. 
LEMUEL THOMAS SMALL, ; Category No. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. s 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole question presented for review is whether the 
court of appeals properly applied this Court's decision in State 
v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in holding that defendant's 
consent to search was not valid and that the evidence seized from 
his vehicle pursuant to his consent was therefore not admissible? 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on March 19, 
1992, and appears in State v. Small, 182 Utah Adv. Rep, 55 (Utah 
App. Mar. 19, 1992) (a copy of the opinion is contained in 
Appendix A). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1992). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the questions presented for review is 
contained in the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Lemuel T. Small, was charged with one count 
of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree 
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991), and 
two counts of possession of controlled substances with intent to 
distribute (methamphetamine and marijuana), second and third 
degree felonies, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 
1991) (R. 150-51). 
After the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence seized incident to the roadblock stop of 
defendant's vehicle and pursuant to his consent, a jury convicted 
him as charged (R. 28, 55-58, 200-02). The court sentenced 
defendant to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison for the second degree felony, and terms of zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison for the two third degree felonies, 
all terms to run concurrently (R. 302). 
Defendant appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, alleging that the stop of his vehicle at the police 
roadblock constituted an unreasonable seizure under the federal 
and state constitutions, and therefore the contraband seized from 
his vehicle pursuant to his consent should have been suppressed. 
Acknowledging the State's concession that the roadblock did not 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
meet the requirements of Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444 (1990), the court of appeals held that the roadblock 
violated the fourth amendment. State v. Small, 182 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 55, 56 (Utah App. Mar. 19, 1992). It further held that, 
under State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), defendant's 
consent to the search of his vehicle was not sufficiently 
attenuated from the unlawful roadblock stop to avoid the taint of 
that initial illegality, and therefore the consent was invalid. 
Id. at 56-57. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE SEEKS CERTIORARI REVIEW FOR THE 
SAME REASONS IT HAS IN STATE V. SIMS, CASE 
NO. 910218: THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED 
STATE V. ARROYO, 796 P.2D 684 (UTAH 1990), IN 
A MANNER THAT APPEARS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH 
FLO"IDA V. ROYER, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), WHICH 
ARROYO IDENTIFIED AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE TWO-
PART TEST FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF 
CONSENT TO SEARCH 
In holding that defendant's consent was not 
sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful roadblock stop to avoid 
the taint of that initial illegality and thus could not provide a 
basis for the search of defendant's car, the court of appeals 
determined that "[t]his case is indistinguishable from fState v.1 
Simsr,808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991)]." Small. 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 57. The Court currently has under advisement the State's 
petition for a writ of certiorari in Sims, Case No. 910218, which 
seeks review on the ground that the court of appeals applied 
State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in a manner that 
appears to be inconsistent with Florida v. Arrovo, 460 U.S. 491 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(1983), which Arroyo identified as an example of the application 
of the exploitation prong of the two-part test for determining 
the validity of consent to search. The State seeks certiorari in 
the instant case on the same basis as in Sims; therefore, it 
incorporates by reference Point II of the Sims certiorari 
petition (Appendix B) and the better developed argument made by 
the State in a case currently pending in the Court, State v. 
Thurman, Case No. 910494 (Appendix C). 
For the reasons argued in the Sims petition for 
certiorari, as further supported by the Thurman brief, this Court 
should grant certiorari and review the court of appeals' 
decision. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /o^day of May, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 0 
Assistant Attorney General 
4 
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State v. Small 
182 Uuh Adv. Rep. 55 
theory outside the context of insurance cont-
racts. Moreover, a broad application of Bracey 
is not reasonable because it would 
eviscerate the general rule; attorney fees would 
be awarded virtually every time a party is 
found in breach of its contract. It is unlikely 
that the Supreme Court intended such a 
drastic result, since the Court continues to 
refer to the general rule as though it had 
continujdftgnificance. See Bracey, 781 P.2d 
at 417riimilarly, it is unlikely the Supreme 
Court Intended such a major departure from 
the long-standing rule without specifically 
saying so. 
A reasonable interpretation of Bracey, then, 
is to confine its authorization of an award of 
attorney fees as consequential damages, incu-
rred in litigation against the other party to the 
contract, to the limited situation where an 
insurer breaches its contract with an insured. 
Since the contract in the present case is not 
insurance related, the Bracey exception does 
not apply. Neither does the third-party exc-
eption. Therefore, we rely on the general rule, 
and disallow the award of attorney fees since 
there is no contractual or statutory basis for 
such an award. 
While we otherwise affirm, we vacate the 
trial court's award of attorney fees. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Both parties agree that the language of the agre-
ement is clear and unambiguous and that interpret-
ation of the agreement is, therefore, a matter of 
law. After fully considering the arguments of Heinz 
and the estate, we are persuaded that the trial court 
correctly held that Heinz breached the settlement 
agreement by failing to pay the estate its complete 
distributive share of the dissolved partnership. We 
also conclude that the trial court correctly awarded 
the estate $97,110.49 as the remaining portion of its 
distributive share due under the settlement agree-
ment. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's interp-
retation of the agreement and the judgment awarded 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of UUh, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Lemuel Thomas SMALL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 900382-CA 
FILED: March 19,1992 
Fourth District, Millard County 
Honorable George E. Ballif 
ATTORNEYS: 
G. Fred Metos and Stephen R. McCaughey, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, David Thompson, and 
Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
This is an appeal from a trial court's denial 
of appellant Lemuel T. Small's motion to 
suppress evidence obtained as a result of a 
roadblock and subsequent search of the 
vehicle in which Small was a passenger. We 
reverse and remand for a new trial in which 
the evidence seized from the vehicle is to be 
suppressed. 
FACTS 
Small does not challenge the trial court's 
findings of fact. Therefore, for purposes of 
this appeal the facts are as follows. 
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway 
Patrol, in conjunction with the Millard 
County Sheriffs office, conducted a roadb-
lock in Millard County, Utah, on a section of 
Interstate 15. Notice of the roadblock was 
published in the Millard County Chronicle one 
week before the roadblock was instituted and 
signs were placed on the freeway, warning 
drivers that they would have to stop. Appro-
ximately fifteen officers were assigned to 
operate the roadblock. They were instructed to 
check for drivers' licenses and vehicle regist-
ration. In addition, the officers were told to 
further question anyone who looked suspic-
ious. 
During the roadblock, all vehicles were 
stopped, including the vehicle in which Small 
was a passenger. The vehicle was driven by 
Dennis Shoulderblade. Officer Jeffrey What-
cott, who executed the stop, testified that both 
Small and Shoulderblade produced valid ide-
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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ntification. The vehicle was not registered to 
either Small or Shoulderbiade. Small told the 
officer that the vehicle belonged to a friend of 
his. Officer Whatcott sought confirmation of 
registration through radio dispatch. He also 
asked Small and Shoulderbiade if there were 
any firearms, alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. 
Both replied in the negative. Officer Whatcott 
requested permission to search the vehicle, and 
Small consented. 
In searching the vehicle, Officer Whatcott 
located a substantial quantity of drugs, drug 
paraphernalia, firearms, and cash. Both Small 
and Shoulderbiade were arrested. Officer 
Whatcott continued to search the vehicle, and 
upon smelling marijuana, opened the trunk of 
the vehicle and discovered more drugs and 
paraphernalia. 
In an amended information, Small and 
Shoulderbiade were charged with several 
counts of possession of controlled substances. 
Both defendants filed motions to suppress the 
evidence that was found in the vehicle. The 
motions were based on the alleged illegality of 
the roadblock. The trial court concluded that 
the roadblock was instituted in a lawful 
manner. The trial court also found that Small 
and Shoulderbiade consented to the search of 
the vehicle, and that the consent was never 
withdrawn. Based on the foregoing, the court 
denied the motions to suppress. 
Small and Shoulderbiade were tried by a 
jury on February 16, 1990. The jury convicted 
Small of one count of possession of a contr-
olled substance (cocaine), a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-
37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), and two counts of 
possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute (methamphetamine and 
marijuana), a second and a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-
37-8(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1988).* 
ISSUES 
Small appeals the denial of his motion to 
suppress, contending that (1) the roadblock 
stop of the vehicle in which he was riding was 
illegal; and (2) because there was insufficient 
attenuation between the illegal roadblock and 
any consent given, all evidence discovered 
subsequent to the roadblock stop should have 
been suppressed by the trial court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a challenge to a lower court's 
suppression ruling, we will not reverse the 
findings of fact underlying that ruling unless 
they are clearly erroneous. State v. Palmer, 
803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990), cert, 
denied, 802 P.2d 748 (Utah 199.1). Those 
factual findings are clearly erroneous only if 
they are against the clear weight of the evid-
ence. State v. Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 
11, 12 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Leonard, 
175 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 (Utah App. 1991). 
The issue of the constitutionality of a roadb-
lock stop is a matter of law which we review 
with no particular deference to the trial 
court's conclusions. State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 
141,144 (Utah App. 1991), cert, pending. 
LEGALITY OF THE ROADBLOCK 
Small asserts that the roadblock at which he 
was stopped violated his constitutional right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Specifically, Small alleges that the roadblock 
did not meet the objective standards required 
by the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. 
At the time of its denial of Small's motion 
to suppress, the trial court did not have the 
benefit of the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). 
The State concedes that the roadblock in the 
present case fails to meet the requirements for 
roadblocks set out in Sitz. We agree. Thus, 
the roadblock stop violated Small's Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable seiz-
ures, and the trial court's conclusion to the 
contrary is reversed.2 
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
FOLLOWING ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK 
Having determined that the roadblock stop 
of the vehicle was unconstitutional, we must 
now determine if the subsequent warrantless 
search was nevertheless valid. Relying on State 
v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991), cert. 
pending, Small asserts that while he consented 
to the search of the vehicle, his consent was 
obtained as a result of an unbroken chain of 
events that began with the illegal roadblock, 
and that as a result, his consent is not valid. 
The State has the burden of establishing 
that the evidence obtained following the illegal 
roadblock was not tainted by showing the 
consent given was sufficiently attenuated from 
that illegality. See Sims, 808 P.2d at 151. 
Two factors determine whether 
consent to a search is lawfully obt-
ained following initial police misc-
onduct. The inquiry should focus 
on whether the consent was volun-
tary and whether the consent was 
obtained by police exploitation of 
the prior illegality. Evidence obta-
ined in searches following police 
illegality must meet both tests to be 
admissible. 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 
1990) (citing 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§8.2(d), at 190 (2d ed. 1987)). The State 
argues that because the trial court did not 
make explicit findings on either prong of the Ar-
royo test, we should remand for the trial 
court to make detailed findings to support the 
consent determination. We decline the State's 
invitation to remand for further findings3 
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because, as this court stated in State v. 
Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 14 & n.3 
(Utah App. 1992), when the record at the 
suppression hearing is sufficiently detailed and 
there are no contested facts, we are in as good 
a position as the trial court to decide the tai-
ntedness/attenuation issue. 
A. Voluntary Consent 
Voluqgutpess of consent is a fact sensitive 
question tod we look to the totality of circu-
mstances to ascertain if there is clear and 
positive testimony that the consent was uneq-
uivocal and freely given. Castner, 179 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 13; Carter, 812 P.2d at 467; State 
v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah 
App. 1991); Stare v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 
887-88 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 
1105 (Utah 1990). The trial court determined 
that Small had consented to the searches. 
Small does not challenge that ruling on 
appeal. However, the trial court did not 
address whether or not the consent was volu-
ntary. This is an important first prong in the Ar-
royo analysis. We find nothing in the und-
isputed facts that suggests Small's consent was 
not voluntary. 
B. Dissipation of Taint 
The conclusion that there was voluntary 
consent does not end our inquiry as we must 
also determine if the consent was untainted by 
the prior illegality. Castner, 179 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 14. "We examine several factors to 
determine if there has been an exploitation of 
a prior illegality: temporal proximity of the 
illegality and the evidence sought to be supp-
ressed, the presence of intervening factors, and 
the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct/ 
Id.; accord Sims, 808 P.2d at 150; Arroyo, 
796 P.2d at 690-91 n.4. 
This case is indistinguishable from Sims. 
The record demonstrates a very short period 
of time elapsed between Small's stop at the 
roadblock and Officer Whatcott's request to 
search. As for intervening factors, none exist. 
The consent was obtained during the ongoing 
illegal roadblock stop. On the uncontroverted 
facts before us, we conclude that Small's 
consent to have the vehicle searched was not 
sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of 
the illegal roadblock. 
CONCLUSION 
Small's convictions are reversed and the 
case is remanded to the trial court for proce-
edings in accord with this opinion. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. The current versions of the statutes under which 
Small was convicted are codified at Utah Code Ann. 
158-374 (Supp. 1992). 
teron-Solorio „ 
idv. Rep. 57 5 7 
2. Because the roadblock does not pass muster 
under the federal constitution, we need not consider 
its validity under the state constitution. See State v. 
Park, 810 P.2d 456, 458 n.l (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
3. We acknowledge that fact-sensitive issues such 
as consent are best resolved by the trial court. 
However, in this case counsel for both Small and 
for the State indicated at oral argument that there 
were no facts in dispute and it was doubtful that 
any further enlightening facts would be forthco-
I ming. 
Cite as 
1S2 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff aod Appellee, 
v. 
Jorge FIGUEROA-SOLORIO 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 910170-CA 
FILED: March 19,1992 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
ATTORNEYS: 
Richard G. Uday, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
R. Paul Van D&n> and David B. Thompson, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
RUSSON, Judge: 
Defendant Jorge Figueroa-Solorio appeals 
his conviction of possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1990). 
FACTS 
On January 1, 1991, Salt Lake City Police 
Officers BX. Smith and Louis Jones observed 
defendant cross State Street at approximately 
916 South in Salt Lake City. There is no cro-
sswalk or traffic light at that location. Acco-
rdingly, the officers decided to issue a jaywa-
lking citation to defendant, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6-79 (1988) of the Motor 
Vehicle Act. 
Officers Smith and Jones approached def-
endant, who had gotten into a parked car. 
They asked defendant to get out of the car 
and then asked for identification. The defen-
dant said that he did not have any I.D., but 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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practice must impliedly be within the statutory authority of a 
peace officer4, explicit authority should not be required. 
Because the court of appeals' state constitutional holding has 
broad implications for law enforcement, this Court should grant 
certiorari and review that holding. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED STATE V. ARROYO, 
796 P.2D 684 (UTAH 1990), IN A MANNER THAT 
APPEARS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH FLORIDA V. 
ROYER, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), WHICH ARROYO 
IDENTIFIED AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE APPLICATION 
OF THE EXPLOITATION PRONG OF THE TWO-PART 
TEST FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF CONSENT 
TO SEARCH; THE ARROYO TEST SHOULD BE 
CLARIFIED BY THIS COURT. 
After the court of appeals had determined that the 
roadblock was unconstitutional under the federal and state 
constitutions, it then addressed the question of whether the 
drugs seized from defendant's vehicle were nevertheless 
admissible because their seizure resulted from a search conducted 
pursuant to defendant's consent. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13-
14. 
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that 
defendant did not challenge the voluntariness of his consent to 
the search, but that he claimed that "there was insufficient 
attenuation between his detention and the consent . . . to purge 
4
 Although the court of appeals concluded that there is 
-nothing in the Utah code that "specifically prohibits the 
roadblock that was conducted here," Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
10, it did not directly resolve the question of whether police 
officers have implied authority to conduct roadblocks. Such 
implied authority can be derived from the general statutes which 
pertain to the authority of law enforcement officers in this 
state. See Utah Code Ann. SS 10-3-914(1) (Supp. 1990), 17-22-2 
(Supp. 1990), 27-10-4(a) & (b) (1989), 41-1-17 (1988). 
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the taint of the illegality of the detention." Id- at 13- It 
noted that under State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), "to 
be constitutionally valid, a search consent following illegal 
police behavior must be both noncoerced and not arrived at by 
exploitation of the primary police illegality*" Ibid. Applying 
the factors outlined in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), 
for evaluating the "non-exploitation or attenuation element," the 
court held that "the record demonstrates that [defendant]'s 
consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of 
the illegal roadblock." Id. at 14. In arriving at this 
conclusion, the court relied most heavily on two factors: (1) 
"the consent was obtained within minutes of the illegal stop, and 
not even under our clear error standard of review could the trial 
court find enough time between the stop and the grant of consent 
to attenuate the relationship between the two;" and (2) the 
record revealed no possibility of intervening circumstances 
between the illegal stop and [defendant]'s grant of consent to 
the search. Ibid. 
In Arrovo. this Court did not make clear how the 
exploitation analysis is to proceed, saying only that the primary 
inquiry is whether the consent was sufficiently "attenuated" from 
the prior illegality such that the consent was not "tainted" by 
that illegality. 796 P.2d at 690-91. The Court noted the Brown 
v. Illinois factors which should be considered, jld. at 690-91 
n.4, but did not make clear whether the primary focus of the 
exploitation analysis is the possible effect of the initial 
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent or rather 
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the police misconduct itself. Arrovo cites numerous cases on the 
issue of exploitation, id. at 690-91, but does not express a 
preference for one of the two approaches those cases appear to 
adopt. 
For example, some of the cases clearly talk about the 
exploitation question in terms of the potential effect of the 
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent. See, 
e.g., United States v. Miller. 821 F.2d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(M[W]e hold that the consent was the product of the illegal 
detention, and that the taint of the unreasonable stop was not 
sufficiently attenuated. . . . [TJhere were insufficient 
intervening circumstances that might have reduced the coercive 
nature of the stop and permitted the appellant to make a 
voluntary decision about the consent search."); United States v. 
Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1981) ("no intervening events 
or lapse of time which would show [the defendant's] consent was 
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of 
the unlawful invasion'"); State v. Raheem. 464 So.2d 293, 298 
(La. 1985) ("Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot 
say that [the defendant's] consent was sufficiently attenuated 
from the illegal arrest and search to be a product of her free 
will."). 
On the other hand, some of the cases mechanically apply 
the exploitation analysis with no apparent concern about whether 
the voluntariness of the consent had been undermined by the 
police misconduct. These cases seem to focus solely on the 
police misconduct and how it may "taint" the consent such that 
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the evidence seized must be suppressed under the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-
Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356# 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Odom, 
83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 39 111.Dec. 406; 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980). 
This approach was followed by the court of appeals in the instant 
case. 
The former approach, which focuses primarily on the 
possible effect of the police misconduct on the voluntariness of 
the consent, appears to be most consistent with the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 
(1983), which this Court identified as an example of the 
application of the exploitation part of the two-part test adopted 
in Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 690. There, in concluding that the 
defendant's consent to the search of his luggage was tainted by 
the prior illegal police detention, a majority of the Supreme 
Court appears to have been most concerned with the coercive 
circumstances under which the consent to search had been obtained 
and the effect that those circumstances had on the voluntariness 
of the consent. Rover, 460 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J., concurring) 
("I agree with the plurality that . . . [the defendant's] 
surrender of the luggage key to the officers cannot be viewed as 
consensual."). 
Because the court of appeals has construed the 
exploitation prong of Arrovo to focus primarily on the "temporal 
proximity" and "intervening circumstances" factors suggested in 
that case, and has implicitly rejected the alternative view that 
-11-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the primary focus is the possible effect of the prior police 
misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent -- a view 
seemingly adopted in Rover, it has decided an important question 
of law which was not decided in Arroyo, but which should be 
decided by this Court. Utah R. App. P. 46(d). Accordingly, the 
Court should grant certiorari and review the court of appeals' 
decision. iju-
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of the second consent, however, the chaos of 
the initial entry was over six hours distant, 
defendant had been informed of his Miranda 
rights a second time and Agent Conner 
reviewed anew each item on the consent form. 
The court therefore concludes from a totality 
of the circumstances that the State has met 
its burden of proof that the second consent 
to search the storage unit was knowingly and 
voluntarily granted. The court makes this 
conclusion after fully considering that 
defendant was shackled for six hours at the 
time he signed the second consent form for 
the storage unit.17 
Id. at 12-13 (R. 78-79). Again, defendant does not show that 
the court's finding of voluntary consent is clearly erroneous, 
content simply to suggest that this Court make a different 
finding on the voluntariness question. Moreover, the record 
provides substantial support for the court's finding. 
In sum, in the absence of a showing that the trial 
court was clearly erroneous, there is no basis for disturbing its 
findings that both of defendant's consents were voluntary. 
Therefore, the court's determination on the first prong of the 
Arrovo test should be upheld. 
Exploitation 
The exploitation prong of the Arrovo test is not so 
easily understood or applied. Addressing this prong, the trial 
court said: 
17
 In arguing both the voluntariness and exploitation prongs 
of Arrovo. defendant places undue emphasis on his being 
handcuffed much of the time and being continuously detained. See 
Br. of Appellant at 11-14. It is well settled that handcuffs and 
custody, while factors to be considered, do not themselves render 
consent involuntary. State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1273-74 (Utah 
App. 1990); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990). 
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The same evidence which persuaded this court 
that each consent was knowingly and 
voluntarily granted equally but independently 
persuades this court that the officers did 
not exploit the initial unlawful entry. The 
circumstances and passage of time from the 
entry to the first consent purged each of the 
consents from the taint of the unauthorized 
-no-knock" entry. The officers did nothing 
to harken back to the entry and did not make 
any further unnecessary show of force not 
otherwise implicit by their presence. 
Focusing solely on the second consent to 
search the storage unit, the passage of time 
proved to be the best antiseptic, cleansing 
the second consent of any taint from the 
unlawful "no-knock" entry. 
Order at 13 (R. 79). Before reviewing this finding of no 
exploitation, some discussion of the second prong of the Arrovo 
test, and the need for this Court to clarify the operation of 
that prong, is necessary. 
Without explaining precisely how the exploitation 
analysis is to proceed, Arrovo suggested only that the specific 
inquiry is whether the consent was sufficiently "attenuated" from 
the prior illegality such that the consent was not "tainted" by 
that illegality. 796 P.2d at 690-91. The Court noted the Brown 
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), factors which should be 
considered, .id. at 690-91 n.4, but did not make clear whether the 
primary focus of the exploitation analysis is the possible effect 
of the initial police misconduct on the voluntariness of the 
consent or rather the police misconduct itself. Arrovo cites 
numerous cases on the issue of exploitation, id. at 690-91, but 
does not express a preference for one of the two approaches those 
cases appear to adopt. Under one approach, voluntariness of the 
32 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
consent is the primary consideration, and if there is voluntary 
consent (i.e., the consent has not been rendered involuntary by 
the prior police illegality), the evidence seized pursuant to the 
consent is generally admissible. Under the other approach, the 
police misconduct itself is the primary consideration. A consent 
to search that is obtained close in time and circumstance to the 
police illegality, although entirely voluntary, is -tainted," and 
the evidence seized pursuant to the consent is inadmissible. 
For example, some of the cases cited in Arrovo discuss 
the exploitation question primarily in terms of the potential 
effect of the police misconduct on the voluntariness of the 
consent. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 550 
(11th Cir. 1987) (f'[W]e hold that the consent was the product of 
the illegal detention, and that the taint of the unreasonable 
stop was not sufficiently attenuated. . . . [T]here were 
insufficient intervening circumstances that might have reduced 
the coercive nature of the stop and permitted the appellant to 
make a voluntary decision about the consent search."); United 
States v, Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1981) ("no 
intervening events or lapse of time which would show [the 
defendant's] consent was 'sufficiently an act of free will to 
purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion'"); State v. 
Raheem. 464 So.2d 293, 298 (La. 1985) ("Under the circumstances 
presented here, we cannot say that [the defendant's] consent was 
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest and search to be 
a product of her free will."). 
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On the other hand, some of the cases mechanically apply 
the exploitation analysis with no apparent concern about whether 
the voluntariness of the consent has been undermined by the 
police misconduct* These cases seem to focus solely on the 
police misconduct and whether it Htaints" the consent such that 
the evidence seized must be suppressed under the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-
Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Odom, 
83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 39 111.Dec. 406, 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980). 
The latter approach was followed by two panels of the 
Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 
1991), cert, pending, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah May 14, 1991), 
and State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 827 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), which involved consent searches after 
illegal roadblock stops18. In Sims, the panel began its 
analysis by acknowledging that the defendant did not challenge 
the voluntariness of his consent to the search, but that he 
claimed "there was insufficient attenuation between his detention 
and the consent . . . to purge the taint of the illegality of the 
detention." 808 P.2d at 150. It applied the Brown v. Illinois 
18
 At the time the roadblocks were set up in Sims and Park, 
there was no decision from either Utah's appellate courts or the 
United States Supreme Court that had directly ruled on the 
legality of such roadblocks. See generally Sims, 808 P.2d at 
142-50. Thus, the roadblocks could not be fairly characterized 
as flagrant violations of the fourth amendment or article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, even though the court of 
appeals concluded that they violated those provisions. 
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factors which Arrovo identified as pertinent to the evaluation of 
the "non-exploitation or attenuation element": "the temporal 
proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of the 
consent, the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, 
and the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct." 
jbid. Concluding that "the record demonstrates [the defendant's] 
consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of 
the illegal roadblock," A£. at 152, the panel relied most heavily 
on two factors: (1) "the consent was obtained within minutes of 
the illegal stop, and not even under our clear error standard of 
review could the trial court find enough time between the stop 
and the grant of consent to attenuate the relationship between 
the two;" and (2) "the record reveal[ed] [no] possibility of 
intervening circumstances between the illegal stop and [the 
defendant's] grant of consent to the search," id. at 151. An 
identical approach was followed by the Park panel in reversing 
the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. 
810 P.2d at 458-59. 
This mechanical application of the exploitation prong, 
which automatically invalidates a search and/or seizure if the 
voluntary consent is closely connected in time and by 
circumstance to the prior illegality (a scenario which is 
frequently present in these kinds of cases), amounts to the "but 
for" rule of exclusion that was rejected in Wono Sun v. United 
States. 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). See United States v. 
Wellins. 654 F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1981) ("lack of significant 
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
intervening period of time does not, in itself, require that the 
evidence be suppressed for want of sufficient attenuation"). As 
stated in Arrovo, "'all evidence is [not] 'fruit of the poisonous 
tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the 
illegal actions of the police.'" 796 P.2d at 688 (quoting Wong 
Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88) (citation omitted). But, given Arrovo's 
ambiguous discussion of the exploitation prong, it was not 
unreasonable for the court of appeals to interpret Arrovo as 
setting forth the mechanical rule applied in Sims and Park. What 
those cases illustrate is the need for clarification by this 
Court of how the exploitation prong should be applied by the 
lower courts. 
A fundamental problem with Sims and Park is that they 
fail to acknowledge that in Arrovo the Court remanded to the 
trial court for a determination of the exploitation issue under 
nearly identical facts (i.e., an illegal vehicle stop which was 
followed shortly thereafter by the defendant's consent to a 
search of the vehicle). 796 P.2d at 692. Had this Court 
considered the close temporal proximity between the illegal stop 
and the consent, coupled with the absence of any intervening 
circumstances, to be dispositive of the exploitation question, as 
Sims and Park concluded, it presumably would not have remanded 
for a determination of that question by the trial court. In 
ordering a remand, Arrovo implicitly rejected the mechanical 
approach to the exploitation analysis employed in Sims and Park. 
The contrary approach to the exploitation inquiry, 
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which focuses primarily on the possible effect of the police 
misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent, appears to be 
most consistent with Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491 (1983), 
identified in Arrovo as an example of the application of the 
exploitation prong in a consent search case. 796 P.2d at 690. 
In Rover, the police stopped the defendant at an airport based on 
a drug courier profile and ultimately obtained his consent to a 
search of his luggagef in which narcotics were found.19 Royer 
moved to suppress the contraband seized from his luggage. The 
trial court denied the motion, ruling that Royer's consent to the 
search was "freely and voluntarily" given. 460 U.S. at 495. The 
intermediate appellate court of Florida reversed, holding that 
Royer's detention was unlawful and that the unlawful detention 
tainted Royer's consent to search. Ibid. That decision was 
19
 The Court recounted Royer's consent as follows: 
[After the detectives had removed Royer to a 
small room and retrieved his luggage from the 
airline], Royer was asked if he would consent 
to a search of the suitcases. Without orally 
responding to this request, Royer produced a 
key and unlocked one of the suitcases, which 
one detective then opened without seeking 
further assent from Royer. Marihuana was 
found in that suitcase. According to 
Detective Johnson, Royer stated that he did 
not know the combination to the lock on the 
second suitcase. When asked if he objected 
to the detective opening the second suitcase, 
Royer said "[n]o, oo ahead,H and did not 
object when the detective explained that the 
suitcase might have to be broken open. The 
suitcase was pried open by the officers and 
more marihuana was found. . . • 
460 U.S. at 494-95. 
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affirmed by the Supreme Court in a plurality opinion. 460 U.S. 
at 493-508. Although, as noted in Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 690, the 
plurality never directly questioned the trial court's finding 
that Royer's consent was "freely and voluntarily" given, it 
nevertheless appears to have been primarily concerned with the 
coercive circumstances under which the consent was obtained and 
the effect those circumstances had on the voluntariness of the 
consent. This is evident from Justice Powell's concurrence, in 
which he wrote: "I agree with the plurality that . . . [the 
defendant's] surrender of the luggage key to the officers cannot 
be viewed as consensual." 460 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
In Arrovo, this Court rejected an exploitation analysis 
that focuses solely on voluntariness, declining to adopt the 
reasoning of United States v. Carson. 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.), 
cert, denied/ 479 U.S. 914 (1986). There, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held: 
[I]n a case in which evidence is obtained 
pursuant to consent granted subsequent to 
illegal police actions, the "exploitation" 
issue under Wong Sun is resolved simply by 
determining whether or not defendant's grant 
of consent was voluntary under the 
circumstances. . . • When defendant's grant 
of consent is voluntary, then there is no 
exploitation; . . . the findings of voluntary 
consent and "exploitation" are mutually 
exclusive. 
793 F.2d at 1149 (emphasis in original). However, the Court's 
rejection of Carson must be considered in connection with its 
reliance on Rover. In this light, Arrovo is most reasonably read 
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as adopting an exploitation analysis that focuses primarily, but 
not solely, on the voluntariness of the consent to search. Under 
such an approach, the Brown v. Illinois factors are more easily 
and logically applied. 
In Brown, the Supreme Court had before it the narrow 
question of whether "the Illinois courts were in error in 
assuming that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, under Wong Sun 
always purge the taint of an illegal arrest." 422 U.S. at 605. 
Brown had been arrested without probable cause and without a 
warrant; and, while in custody and after being given Miranda 
warnings, he made two inculpatory statements concerning a murder. 
Id. at 591, 594-95. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that, 
although Brown's arrest was illegal, the giving of Miranda 
warnings "'served to break the causal connection between the 
illegal arrest and the giving of the statements, and that 
defendant's act in making the statements was 'sufficiently an act 
of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful 
invasion.' (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, at 486.)'" 
Jd. at 597 (quoting People v. Brown, 56 111.2d 312, 317, 307 
N.E.2d 356, 358 (1974)). At bottom, the state court held that 
"the Miranda warnings in and of themselves broke the causal chain 
so that any subsequent statement, even one induced by the 
continuing effects of unconstitutional custody, was admissible so 
long as, in the traditional sense, it was voluntary and not 
coerced in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." 
Ibid. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the 
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implication of its holding in Wonor Sun to the facts of Brown's 
case. Ibid. 
The Court began by reviewing its holding in Wong Sun, 
where the issue was "whether statements and other evidence 
obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be excluded.M 
Id. at 597. The statements were obtained from two defendants, 
Wong Sun and Toy. Toy's statement was obtained immediately after 
he was pursued and illegally arrested by six agents. It 
apparently was a spontaneous response to a question asked him in 
the frenzy of that event, and the agents apparently made no 
attempt to advise him of his right to remain silent. On the 
other hand, Wong Sun's statement, also obtained after an illegal 
arrest, was not given until after he was arraigned and released 
on his own recognizance. He voluntarily returned to the station 
a few days after his arrest for questioning, and his statement 
came after he had been advised of his right to remain silent and 
to have counsel present. Id,, at 607-08 (Powell, J., concurring 
in part). Under these facts, the Wona Sun Court ruled that Toy's 
statement should not have been admitted as evidence against him, 
holding that "the statement did not result from 'an intervening 
independent act of a free will,' and that it was not 
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of 
the unlawful invasion.'- IcL at 598 (quoting Wona Sun. 371 U.S. 
at 486). However, with respect to Wong Sun's confession, the 
Court ruled that it was admissible because "the connection 
between his unlawful arrest and the statement 'had become so 
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attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'" Ibid, (quoting Wono Sun, 
371 U.S. at 491) (citation omitted). 
The Brown Court then made clear that "[t]he 
exclusionary rule . • • was applied in Wona Sun primarily to 
protect Fourth Amendment rights. Protection of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination was not the Court's 
paramount concern there." 2d. at 599 (emphasis in original). In 
short, the Court's foremost concern was to apply the fourth 
amendment exclusionary rule where it would serve its primary 
purpose of deterring illegal conduct by the police ~ thus the 
different rulings regarding Toy's statement and Wong Sun's 
statement. As Justice Powell admonished in his concurring 
opinion, "the Wono Sun inquiry always should be conducted with 
the deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
sharply in focus." Id. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring in part) 
(citation omitted). 
It was against this backdrop that the Brown Court 
rejected the per se rule of admission adopted by the Illinois 
courts and also declined to adopt an alternative per se or "but 
for" rule of exclusion. Instead, the Court concluded that "[t]he 
question whether a confession is the product of a free will under 
Wona Sun roust be answered on the facts of each case[,] [and] no 
single fact is dispositive." Id. at 603. It made clear that the 
presence of Miranda warnings does not control the determination 
of whether a confession that has followed a fourth amendment 
violation is admissible. While that factor is important in 
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determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of 
the fourth amendment violation, other relevant factors are to be 
considered, including: "[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest 
and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, 
andf particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct." jCd. at 603-04 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
It is with this understanding of Wona Sun and Brown 
that Arrovo must be read. As previously discussed, Arrovo 
specifically relied on Rover as an example of the application of 
the exploitation analysis to a case where evidence was seized 
pursuant to a consent to search which followed an initial fourth 
amendment violation. The Rover plurality's primary concern 
appears to have been the voluntariness of the consent to search. 
Thus, Arrovo's reference to the Brown factors, coupled with its 
reliance on Rover and its rejection of Carson, is most reasonably 
interpreted as an adoption of an exploitation analysis which (1) 
focuses primarily, but not solely, on the voluntariness of the 
consent, (2) applies the Brown factors to determine whether the 
voluntariness of the consent was in fact affected by the prior 
police illegality, and (3) considers whether the police 
misconduct was sufficiently flagrant or purposeful that the 
evidence should be excluded even though the consent to search was 
entirely voluntary. The inquiry would proceed as follows: (1) 
Was the the consent in fact rendered involuntary by the temporal 
proximity between the fourth amendment violation and the consent, 
the absence of any intervening circumstances, or flagrant police 
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misconduct?20 (2) Even if it is determined that the consent was 
voluntary after consideration of the possible effect of all three 
Brown factors, was the police misconduct purposeful or flagrant 
such that the evidence should be excluded in order to deter that 
level of police misconduct? Kith respect to this second 
question, if there is a purposeful or flagrant violation of the 
fourth amendment, then the first two Brown factors (temporal 
proximity and intervening circumstances) are considered to 
determine if there is sufficient "attenuation" to remove the 
"taint" from the flagrant violation which would naturally flow 
under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 
In his concurring opinion in Brown, Justice Powell 
illustrated this process in the confession context: 
I would require the clearest indication of 
attenuation in cases in which official 
conduct was flagrantly abusive of Fourth 
Amendment rights.... In such cases the 
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is 
most likely to be effective, and the 
corresponding mandate to preserve judicial 
integrity most clearly demands that the 
fruits of the official misconduct be denied. 
I thus would require some demonstrably 
effective break in the chain of events 
leading from the illegal arrest to the 
statement, such as actual consultation with 
counsel or the accused's presentation before 
a magistrate for a determination of probable 
cause, before the taint can be deemed 
removed. 
20
 Consideration of voluntariness under the exploitation 
prong of the Arrovo test may overlap to some degree with the 
voluntariness inquiry which has already occurred under the first 
prong of that test. However, under the exploitation prong, 
particular attention is paid to the police illegality and its 
possible effect on voluntariness. 
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422 U.S. at 610-11 (citations omitted). A similar analysis would 
be made in the consent to search case, and the first two Brown 
factors would determine whether the consent was sufficiently 
attenuated in terms of time and circumstance to be free of the 
taint of the flagrant police misconduct.21 
This approach recognizes both that Min some 
circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on legitimate demands of 
law enforcement than can be justified by the rule's deterrent 
purposes," and that in cases of flagrant police misconduct "the 
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is most likely to be 
effective.*1 Brown, 422 U.S. at 608-09, 611 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part). 
The Court should clarify Arrovo in the foregoing 
manner. The exploitation prong will then be understandable and 
more easily applied. 
Under the proposed clarification, the trial court's 
exploitation/attenuation finding should be upheld. In fact, the 
court essentially applied Arrovo in the manner suggested. 
Apparently proceeding with the assumption that the violation of 
section 77-23-10 was not flagrant (a correct assumption, in that 
there was no indication the officers purposefully violated the 
21
 For example, had the officers' conduct in Sims actually 
been flagrant, which it was not, the court of appeals would have 
been correct in excluding the evidence on the basis that there 
was no significant lapse of time or intervening circumstances 
between the consent to search and the illegality. But in the 
absence of flagrant conduct, the approach followed in Sims was 
incorrect for the reasons previously discussed. 
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statute), the court focused primarily on the voluntariness of 
defendant's consent in light of the prior illegality. This is 
obvious from the court's statement that "[t]he same evidence 
which persuaded th[e] court that each consent was knowingly and 
voluntarily granted equally but independently persuades th[e] 
court that the officers did not exploit the initial unlawful 
entry.- Order at 13 (R. 79). The court applied the first two 
Brown factors, temporal proximity and intervening circumstances, 
by specifically considering the changed circumstances and the 
passage of time between the unlawful entry and the two consents. 
Eighty-five minutes passed between the officers' initial entry 
and defendant's signing of the first consent form for the search 
of his storage unit, and the situation within his apartment had 
calmed significantly from the "chaosM associated with the entry. 
Defendant's signing of the second consent form at the storage 
unit, over five hours after the initial entry and under 
circumstances where he was not handcuffed and was allowed to move 
around (R. 128-29), was even more attenuated from the entry. See 
Order at 13. 
In sum, the trial court found that the passage of time 
and the changed circumstances significantly reduced the 
possibility that the officers' unlawful entry undermined 
defendant's free will in giving his consent. This approach is 
entirely consistent with several cases cited with apparent 
approval in Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 691, and which were noted above: 
United States v. Miller. 821 F.2d at 550 (H[W]e hold that the 
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consent was the product of the illegal detention, and that the 
taint of the unreasonable stop was not sufficiently attenuated. . 
• . [T]here were insufficient intervening circumstances that 
might have reduced the coercive nature of the stop and permitted 
the appellant to make a voluntary decision about the consent 
search.-); United States v. Taheri. 648 F.2d at 601 (Hno 
intervening events or lapse of time which would show [the 
defendant's] consent was 'sufficiently an act of free will to 
purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion'"); State v, 
Raheem, 464 So.2d at 298 ("Under the circumstances presented 
here, we cannot say that [the defendant's] consent was 
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest and search to be 
a product of her free will."). In that the court's finding of 
attenuation is supported by the record and defendant has not 
shown clear error, that finding should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
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